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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MOSE ALIX, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. Case No. 9167 
vs. 
LEON BROWN, 
Intervening Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF INTERVENING PLAINTIFF AND 
RESPONDENT, LEON BROWN 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant's Statement of facts includes as 
"facts" too many statements, to qudte the expres-
sion of the appellant's attorney, "dehors the record", 
to be acceptable to the respondent. For example it 
is stated at page 2 of the appellant's brief :-"Plain-
'tiff Pender's title is deraigned from Arnold E. Wall, 
the heir or beneficiary of Nellie Wall, who was the 
owner of said property ( Rec. 35) ". Rec. 35 is a 
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photostatic copy of a quit claim deed from one 
Arnold E. Wall to the appellant. This document 
does not in any way substantiate the statement 
that Nellie W aU was the owner of the property -
nor can any substantiation of this rather crucial 
point be found anywhere else in 'the entire record. 
In view of this and other innaccuracies in the State-
ment of Facts of the Appellant, Respondent chooses 
to make his own statement of facts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent herein, Leon Brown, for a consider-
ation of $200.00, acquired by Deed of Salt Lake 
County the title of said County to the following de-
scribed real estate located within said County:-
Commencing 612¥2 feet South and 66 
feet West from the Northwest Corner of 
Block 4, Plat "C", Salt Lake County Survey, 
running thence North 300 feet, thence West 
2'96 feet, thence South 328 feet 'to river, East-
erly along river to beginning. (R. 28). 
The County deed was dated September 16th, 
1942, and was duly recorded in the office of the 
Recorder of Salt Lake County on September 18, 
1942 in Book 261 at Page 637. (R. 10, 28) Respon-
dent entered into possession of the ground described 
in the deed and made use of said ground in the con-
duct of the floral business owned and operated by 
him. ( R. 10) The use consisted of plowing the land, 
clearing weeds from it, planting crops on it, and use 
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as a growing yard and storage yard. ( R. 10) Re-
spondent paid all taxes lawfully levied and assessed 
against the said land from the da:te of acquisition 
by him from the County to the date of the filing 
of the complaint in intervention in the case now 
before this court. (R. 10, 12-27 inc.) 
On May 19, 1948, a Notice of Lis Pendens -v1as 
filed by appellant through his attorney, Milton V. 
Backman, with the Recorder of Salt Lake County, 
which notice was entered in Book 610 at Page 205 
of the records of that office. ( R. 80) This notice 
contained a statement that Rennold Pender had filed 
a complaint in the District Court of the Third Judi-
cial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, praying for judgment in favor of the p1lain-
tiff and against the defendants quieting title to the 
property described in the notice, which along with 
numerous other tracts of land contained a descrip-
tion of the tract in question in the instant action. 
( R. 80) Leon Brown, though his interest in the 
land in question was of record, as above set forth, 
was never joined as a party to the action commenced 
by Pender. (R. 1 Par. 3., R. 3 Par. 4., R. 6 & 7 
second defense & appellant's brief P. 2 & 6.) To rid 
his title of the cloud of the recorded Lis Pendens and 
of any claim by the appellant or other parties to the 
action, Respondent, on the 9th day of July 19'59 
moved the court for permission under the Rules of 
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Civil Procedure to intervene in the action com-
menced by appellant. (R. 1, 2) The intervention was 
granted by the court and an order entered July 
17th, 1959 authorizing Respondent to file a com-
plaint in intervention and directing appellant to 
answer the same within 20 days from service of the 
order and the con1plaint. (R. 5) The order was 
served the day it vvas entered, on counsel for the 
appellant. (R. 5) Appellant filed an answer to the 
complaint in intervention on July 31, 1959 denying 
respondents allegations of 'title but not affirmatively 
pleading any title in the appellant. (R. 6) A motion 
for judgment on the pleadings and for summary 
judgment was fi'led by Respondent supported by 
affidavit and exhibits consisting of photostatic copies 
of the deed from Salt Lake County to the Respon-
dent and of the receipted tax notices from 1943 
through 1958. ( R. 8-28 inc.) The matter was called 
up for hearing on respondent's motion, and at the 
hearing thereon appellant appeared by his counsel 
Milton V. Backman and requested leave to file an 
amended answer. This request was resisted by re-
spondent, but the Court overruled respondent's ob-
jection, denied the motion for summary judgment 
and permitted the amended answer to be filed. 
(R. 7) Thereupon, Respondent filed a second mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings and for sum-
mary judgment. (R. 29, 30) Appellant filed a doc-
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ument entitled "Plaintiff's Supporting Documents 
Filed in Connection With Second Motion of Inter-
vening Plaintiff for Summary Judgment". (R. 31) 
This document listed several attachments which were 
filed with the document including a photostatic copy 
of an unrecorded quit claim deed from one Arnold. 
E. Wall to appellant and describing the property 
of interest herein, as well as other property. The 
deed from Wall bore the date of August 2'9th, 1951, 
which is substantia!lly after the date of the filing 
of the Lis Pendens by the Appellant. (R. 35, 80) 
No evidence was ever produced nor is there any 
portion of the record which in any way connects 
this isolated deed with the chain of legal or fee 
title to the property. The motion for summary judg-
ment and judgment on the pleadings was duly and 
regularly called up for hearing before the court 
by the respondent. At the hearing no testimony was 
taken nor other evidence introduced. On this state 
of the record, after having heard the arguments of 
counsel the court took the matter under advise-
ment and subsequently caused a minute entry to 
be made of its order granting the summary judg-
ment as prayed. (R. 65) A written Judgment and 
Decree were duly presented to the Court and signed 
October 9th, 1959 by the Honorab1e Joseph G. Jepp-
son, Judge. (R. 66-68). A copy of the Judgment and 
Decree was duly served upon Counsel for Appel-
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lant, but no objections were ever filed to any of 
the Findings contained therein nor to the Judgment 
and Decree itself. Within the time allowed by law, 
Rennold Pender, appellant, filed a Notice of Appeal 
to -this Court. (R. 69) While there are numerous 
other parties named defendants to the original ac-
tion commenced by appellant in which respondent 
was permitted to intervene, no party other than 
appelaant Pender and respondent Brown in any man-
ner appeared or participated in the proceedings in 
the court below from which this appeal 1s pro-
secuted. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT'S RIGHT IN THE LAND IN QUES-
TION BASED UPON POSSESSION UNDER TAX DEED 
FROM SALT LAKE COUNTY AND PAYMENT OF ALL 
TAXES LAWFULLY ASSESSED THEREON FOR A 
PERIOD OF MORE THAN FIFTEEN YEARS PRIOR 
TO FILING OF THE COMPLAINT IN INTERVEN-
TION BY RESPONDENT IS A SUFFICIENT TITLE 
TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER 
COURT QUIETING TITLE IN RESPONDENT. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT HAS SHOWN NO RIGHT TITLE OR 
INTEREST IN OR TO THE LAND IN QUESTION AND 
CANNOT BE HEARD TO COMPLAIN OF THE JUDG-
MENT OF THE LOWER COURT QUIETING TITLE 
IN THE RESPONDENT. 
POINT III 
ANY CLAIM OF APPELLANT IS BARRED BY 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
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ARGUMENT 
No a'ttem pt is here made by Respondent to 
answer the argument of Appellant under the same 
points as those set forth in appellants brief because 
the points there enumerated are, in the opinion of 
respondent, entirely incidental to the main issue 
before the court, and will be disposed of by the ar-
gument here presented on the basic issues which 
respondent believes the court must decide. 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT'S RIGHT IN THE LAND IN QUES-
TION BASED UPON POSSESSION UNDER TAX DEED 
FROM SALT LAKE COUNTY AND PAYMENT OF ALL 
TAXES LAWFULLY ASSESSED THEREON FOR A 
PERIOD OF lVIORE THAN FIFTEEN YEARS PRIOR 
TO FILING OF THE COMPLAINT IN INTERVEN-
TION BY RESPONDENT IS A SUFFICIENT TITLE 
TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER 
COURT QUIETING TITLE IN RESPONDENT. 
Respondent, Leon Brown, pleaded in his com-
plaint in intervention that he was the owner of 
the tract of land therein described having acquired 
title to it from Salt Lake County by deed of said 
County duly recorded, and that he had owned, oc-
cupied and possessed said property under claim of 
right and paid all taxes lawfully assessed thereon. 
( R. 3, 4) Appellant by his Answer and likewise by 
his amended answer to the complaint in interven-
tion denied this allegation of the respondent, but 
did not affiratively plead either that the 'title thus 
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claimed by respondent was defective nor did appel-
lant plead any title in himself (R. 6, 7) In the 
amended answer which appellant was permitted to 
file, appellant pleaded tha:t the complaint in inter-
vention was barred by the provisions of Sections 
104-2-5 and 104-2-5, 11 UCA 1943. (R. 7) No 
reliance on this defense was had at the hearing be-
fore the court, and the ma:tter is not presented nor 
argued by appellant before this court and conse-
quently it is assumed that the defense thus pleaded 
was abandoned. 
Respondent filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and summary judgment under the applic- 'I 
able ru[es of civil procedure and supported the mo-
tion with the affidavit of respondent and a photo-
sta:tic copy of the deed from Salt Lake County 
bearing the recording data, and copies of each of 
the annual general property tax notices bearing 
the payment received stamp and validation number 
of the County Treasurer for the years from 1943 
to and including 1958, the last year for which taxes 
had become payable prior to the filing of the corn-
plaint in intervention. ( R. 8-30) The affidavit of 
the respondent alleged the acquisition by respondent 
of the title and interest of Salt Lake County by 
deed and the continuous possession of the property 
by respondent and use thereof in the floral business 
owned by respondent consisting of plowing of said 
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land, clearing the weeds therefrom, planting of 
crops therein, use of lands for growing yards and 
storage yards continuously and successively from 
the acquisition of said lands to the commencement 
of the action in intervention, and the payment of 
all taxes levied and assessed upon the premises. 
( R. 10) No counter affidavit was ever filed by 
appellant. Appellant filed a document entitled, 
"Plaintiff's Supporting Documents Filed In Con-
nection With Second Motion of Intervening Plain-
tiff For Summary Judgment." (R. 31) To this 
were appended copies of the following documents 
which were listed therein, Affidavit of lVIrs. Robert 
Ford dated October 5th, 1959; Affidavit of Walter 
E. Porschatis, dated October 3rd, 1959; quit claim 
deed of Arnold E. Wall to Rennold Pender, dated 
August 29, 1951; Protest of L. H. Gray dated May 
20, 1936, recorded Book 167, Page 80 Salt Lake 
County Recorder's Records, and a Natice of Lis 
Pendens filed by Rennold Pender at 'the time of 
commencement of the action in which this interven-
tion was ultimately filed. (R. 31, 35, 78-80) Ap-
pellant offered no testimony or other evidence a't 
any time. It is apparent from the argument that 
appelQant considered that in some manner an issue 
of fact was presented by the filing of the documents 
referred to, which could not be resolved except by 
Trial and which was pertinent to the issues before 
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the court. Appellant argues therefore that the sum-
mary judgment should not have been granted. It 
is submitted that an examination of all of the ma-
terial submitted by the appellant does not raise any 
issue or dispute of fact which is even material to 
the matter which was before the court, to wit, the 
valid!ty of the tax title claimed by the respondent, 
and the status which he claimed to enjoy thereunder 
as the possessor paying taxes for more than fifteen 
years. It is noted that there is not one arlegation of 
possession in the appellant, nor contravention of 
any of the facts upon which the respondent based his 
title. 
It is noted that at page 5 of appellants brief 
the attempt is made to assail the validity of the 
County deed. The argument there presented is so 
fallacious as to hardly merit the dignity of a reply. 
There is not one scintilla of law that says that the 
purchaser of a tax title is subject to the maxim 
- "let the Buyer beware", and no such law is cited 
by the appellant. Appellant attempts to rely upon 
the affidavit of L. H. Gray as giving notice to all 
the world and respondent in particular of a defect 
in the tax title. The quotation therefrom in appel-
lant's brief is entirely misleading. A reading of 
the document reflects that far from setting forth 
any irregularity in connection with the imposition 
or collection of the taxes protested therein, Mr. Gray 
10 
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bases his protest entirely on the fact that the owner, 
whom he purports to represent, did not have the 
money to pay the taxes, and due to the depression 
was unable to borrow any money with which to 
pay the taxes, and that therefore any attempt to 
collect the taxes was an unconstitutional delegation 
of powers and illegal. ( R. 78, 79) Far from being 
notice of any imperfection in the tax title or the 
procedures in levying the taxes the document speaks 
in clear terms of the fact that the taxes were due 
and payable and the owner could not pay them. 
By a statement, which appellants brief at Page 5 
admits is entirely "dehors the record", appellant 
seeks to bring before this court a technical defect 
in the procedure which appeillant claims occured, 
in that the auditors affidavit was not attached for 
the years involved in the sale. Counsel attempts to 
lay claim that the affidavit of Gray is bottomed on 
this defect. A reading of the affidavit conclusively 
disproves this al1legation. Appellant offered no proof 
of any such defect or of any other defect in the 
title passed by the deed of Salt Lake County. It 
was the burden of the appellant to plead and to 
prove such defects if any were claimed and there 
was no atter.apt made by appellant to do so. Tha;t it 
is the burden of the party asserting a defect in 'the 
title of one claiming under a Tax Deed from the 
County, to plead and prove the defect is well estab-
ll 
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lished. Title 80-10-68 UCA 1943 was enacted into 
law as chapter 101 Laws of Utah 1939. This sec-
tion states, 
"* * * ( 5) The county auditor is author-
ized in the name of 'the county to execute deeds 
conveying in fee simple all property sold at 
said public sale to the purchaser and to at-
test the same with his seal. Deeds issued by 
the county auditor in pursuance of this sec-
tion or of section 80-10-66 shall recite the 
total amount of all the delinquent taxes, pen-
alties, interest and costs which were paid in 
for the execution and delivery of the deed, the 
year for which the property was assessed and 
sold to the county at preliminary sale, a full 
description of the property and the name of 
the grantee, and when executed and delivered 
by the auditor shall be prima facie evidence 
of all proceedings subsequent to the prelim-
inary sale and of conveyance of the property 
to the grantee in fee simple. * * * (8) All 
property for which there is no purchaser 
at the sale heretofore provided for in this 
section may be disposed of at either public 
or private sale for such price and upon such 
terms as the said board may determine; * * * 
The county clerk is authorized to execute 
deeds for all property sold pursuant to this 
subsection in the name of the county and at-
test the same by his seal, vesting in the pur-
chaser all of the title of all taxing unit or 
districts in the real estate sold." 
Examination of the deed given in this instance 
to respondent discloses that it complies with the 
statute as to form and recitals and is executed as 
required by law. (R. 28) 
12 
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This Court has recognized the effect of the 
1939 amendment to the code and its effect in mak-
ing the tax deed prima facie evidence of the regu-
larity of the proceedings subsequent to the preli-
minary sale in the case of Anson v. EUison, 104 Utah 
576, 140 P2d 653 at page 655 where it is said: 
"* * * the 1939 amendment to 80-10-68 
(L '39, Ch 101) which amendment author-
ized the issuance of a new form of tax deed 
and made this new tax deed prima facie evi-
dence of the regularity of all proceedings sub-
sequent to the preliminary sale. * * *" 
Even prior to this amendment to the law, when 
there was no s'tatuory authority for the effect of 
the deed and the claimant under the deed was re-
quired to prove the regularity of the proceedings 
leading up to the deed in order to give it effect, this 
court recognized that the deed by itself was suffi-
cient title to vrithstand the onslaught of a mere 
intruder who did not in any manner connect him-
self with 'the chain of title or show himself in any 
way to be the fee owner or claiming through him. 
In the case of Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 34 
P2d 697 this court said: 
"It is earnestJly urged on behalf of de-
fendant that plaintiff failed to establish any 
title to the property in question. Such conten-
tion is founded upon the fact as shown by the 
evidence 'that Plaintiff's grantor acquired his 
title by a tax deed from Sevier county. It is 
apparently defendant's position that he may 
13 
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not be deprived of his possession of the dis-
puted strip of land and of his claim of title ·,··'·. 
except by one who establishes a superior title -
'thereto, and that plaintiff failed to establish 
any title. Our attention is directed to the fol-
lowing cases (citing cases) . The cases cited 
are authority for the doctrine that one whose 
'ti'~le is founded upon a tax deed must prove 
a strict compliance with the various provi-
sions of the Statute regulating the levy of 
taxes and the sale of the property upon which 
the tax has become delinquent ·when such tax 
title is asserted against the original owner or 
one claiming under him. A different rule is a p-
lied when a tax deed is asserted against a 
mere intruder. In such case it has been held 
that a purchaser at a tax sale has all that is 
required against one who enters without right. 
Black on Tax Titles Sec. 445, P. 564, 61 C. J. 
1396, and cases cited in the footnotes. It is 
not necessary, however, to determine whether 
'the defendant's claim to the land in question 
was such as to entitle him to attack such deed 
issued to p!laintiff's grantor, because defen-
dant did not attempt to attack such deed. 
While in his answer, defendant denied gener-
ally plaintiff's ownership of the land de-
scribed in the complaint, it is apparent from 
the pleadings and the evidence that the sole 
issue tried out was whether or not defendant 
had acquired title to the strip of land within 
his inclosure by reason of his claim of a long 
established boundary line. The only evidence 
offered concerning the tax deed was the mere 
fact that such a deed had been given to plain-
tiff's grantor. Defendant, through his counsel, 
stipu1lated that such a deed had been given. 
The record is silent as to the owner of the 
1 ,j 
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land before it was sold for taxes. * * * In the 
absence of some evidence tending to show the 
invalidity of the tax deed issued by Sevier 
County to plaintiff's grantor, it may not be 
said that plaintiff failed to make out a prima 
facie title to the land claimed by him." 
The parallel between the cited case and the 
case before the court is interesting because likewise 
in this case there is no issue raised about the Tax 
deed and there is no evidence in the record what-
ever as to the owner prior to the sale· for taxes. We 
submit that either according to the benefit of the 
statutory effect given to the Tax deed at the time of 
its issuance, or under the state of the law as recog-
nized by the court in the above citation prior to the 
amendment of the statute in 1939, the action of 
the court below in recognizing respondents tax deed 
as sufficient was correct. 
Appelllant further argues a't some length in his 
brief that the affidavits of Porschalis and of Ford 
show a lack of possession in respondent and raise 
an issue on this point. It was admitted by both 
parties 'that the land is a vacant lot, that no struc-
ture has been raised thereon. Respondent claimed 
to have used the ground in his floral business, cleared 
the weeds and to have plowed the same and grown 
crops thereon. ( R. 10) Far from disproving the 
allegations of the respondent the affidavits of both 
Porschatis and of Ford substantiate the claim of 
15 
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the respondent. Porschatis says, "The only time I 
have seen any occupancy on this property was ap-
proximately from two to three and a half years 
ago when a portion of this property was for one 
season used for growing gladiolus." (R. 34) Mrs. 
Ford says, "In one year soon after 1946 someone 
attempted to raise some vegetables on a portion of 
the property and the vegetaHles turned out to be 
a failure, full of worms. About 1956 someone tried 
to raise some flowers for one season on a portion 
of the property and it vvas a failure." (R. 32) Cer-
tainly these statements are consistent ·with the state-
ments of the respondent, and it must be noted that 
there is no evidence of any intervening use incon-
sistent with the use of the respondent which in any 
way dispossessed him. The allegation that is made 
in Mrs. Ford's affidavit tha:t the city dredged the 
river and put the leavings on the bank of the river 
along the land in question does not indicate any 
dispossession of the respondent in the absence of a 
showing that ft was done without his permission 
and without right by the city. No showing of this 
nature is made. Under this state of the record re-
spondent asserts that no substantial issue of fact 
on possession was before the court, and 'the record 
substantiates the action of the Court in granting 
the summary judgment quieting title in the respon-
dent to the land in question. 
16 
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POINT II 
APPELLANT HAS SHOWN NO RIGHT TITLE OR 
INTEREST IN OR TO THE LAND IN QUESTION AND 
CANNOT BE HEARD TO COMPLAIN OF THE JUDG-
MENT OF THE LOWER COURT QUIETING TITLE 
IN THE RESPONDENT. 
Appellant did not plead tiBle 'to the land in 
question was in himself, nor did he offer any cre-
dible proof that tide to the land in question was in 
him, ( R. 6. r1) nor did he submit any proof that he 
was ever at any time in possession of the land in 
question or had paid any taxes thereon. Appellant's 
sole effort at shovving any interest in the land in 
question to be in himself consisted of the filing as a 
part of the document filed in the lower court in re-
sponse 'to respondent's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and summary judgment, two documents, 
the first a Lis Pendens in which it is stated that, 
"* * * Rennold Pender has filed his com-
plaint in the District Court of the Third Judi-
cial District in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, praying for judgment in favor 
of plaintiff and against defendants, quieting 
tit'le in plaintiff in and to the following de-
scribed properties situated in Salt Lake Coun-
ty, State of Utah, * * *'' 
The Lis Pendens then described many tracts of 
property one of which was the tract in vo1ved herein. 
( R. 80) . This Notice of Lis Pendens was filed with 
the recorder of Salt Lake County May 19th, 1948 
and duly entered in the records of that office. (R. 80) 
The Tax Deed to Leon Brown was recorded Sep-
tember 18, 1942. (R. 28) It is admitted that 
17 
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Leon Bro·'iJvn ~ras not made a party defendant 
to the action commenced by appellant. (Appellant's 
brief P. 2 & 6 & R. 1 Par. 3, 3 Par. 4) The only 
other evidence in any way attempting to show ti~le 
in appellant consisted of a photostatic copy of a 
quit claim deed from one Arnold E. Wall to the· 
appellant. (R. 35). This deed bears date of Aug-
ust 29'th, 1'951, and had not been recorded. It is 
observed that 'the deed is dated substantially after 
the filing of the Lis Pendens referred to above. 
These two documents stand entirely isolated. No: 
effort was made by appellant to introduce any evi-
dence of the connection of the deed of Arnold E. vVall 
with the chain of title. The appellant in his brief 
states that Nellie Wall was the owner of the pro-
perty. Not one scintilla of evidence of this fact was 
ever offered, nor can any such be found in the 
record. The deed of Arnold E. Wall, who claims 
to be a beneficiary under the Last Will and Testa-
ment of Nellie M. Wall deceased, in the absence of 
a showing of some title in the grantor, is meaning-
less. The deed is not a warranty deed. A quit claim. 
deed under the existing law conveys only the inter-· 
est of the grantor at the time that the deed was· 
given. Appellant 'totally failed to show any interest 
of the gran tor in the land in question. Likewise the 
appellant never at any time pleaded nor proved that 
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perty or paid any taxes. The presumption indulged 
in under the 1aws of this state of possession of the 
legal owner is of no avail to appellant in the ab-
sence of a showing or a pleading that he was the 
legal owner. 
Interestingly enough this court in a previous 
decision rendered in regard to other property in-
volved in this same suit commenced by Pender has 
told this same appellant that the mere presentation 
of an isolated deed to property the validity of which 
was ndt proved gave the a ppe1lant no standing to 
assail the title of the tax title holder. We refer to 
the case of Pender v. Bird, 119 Utah 91, 224 P2d 
1057. In that case Pender presented a deed from 
one Hansen who did appear in the chain of title 
which in that case (contrary to the procedure in the 
instant case) was introduced in evidence. But it 
appeared that Hansen told Pender when he gave 
the deed that the appearance of his name in the 
chain of title was solely by reason of his receiving 
title as security for a debt, that the debt had been 
paid and tha:t he made no claim to the property. 
Pender nevertheless took a quit claim deed from 
Hansen. This court said, 
"Respondents ( R. L. and Mae Bird in 
that case) as herein above noted had posses-
sion of the property at the time of commence-
ment of the action. Even assuming that the 
tax 'title from the County was defective it gave 
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the defendants, R. L. Bird and Mae Bird, 
color of title which was clea1~ly superior to 
the claims of record title asserted by plaintiff 
which was shown to be invalid. Thus, there 
was before the court a plaintiff with no ves-
tige of title and defendants with color of title 
who were in possession . . . Certainly defen-
dants' title, however, defective it may be, is 
nevertheless ample to withstand the assault 
of the plaintiff so long as the plaintiff shows 
no right, title or interest whatever in the 
property . . . '' 
In order to have the standing to attack the ac-
tion of the court in quieting title in the respondent 
appellant must show title in himself. He cannot 
prevail in an action of this kind by pointing out a 
weakness, reaJl or supposed in the title of the res-
pondent. 
This rule has been so generally recognized as 
to be almost platitudinous. 
"As frequently stated, the complainants 
right to relief depends upon the strength of 
his own ti'tle, not upon the weakness of the 
title of his opponent. Having failed to estab-
lish title in himself, he cannot complain of 
insufficiency of the evidence upon which 
the court adjudged title to be in the defen-
dant." 44 Am. Jur. Quieting Title P. 69, 
Sec. 83. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has 
said: 
"The rule in ejectment is that the plain-
tiff must recover on the strength of his own 
title and not on the weakness of the title of 
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his adversary. A like rule obtains in an equit-
able action to remove a cloud from a title, 
and title in the complainant is of 'the essence 
of the right to relief." -Dick v. Roraker, 155 
lJS 404, 39 L. Ed. 201. 
This Court said in Campbell v. Union Savings 
and Investment Co., 63 Utah 366; 226 Pacific 190: 
"If, therefore, the defendant has shown 
no right to or interest in the premises, which 
it has not, how can it be heard to complain 
that the court erred in adjudging plaintiff to 
be the owner as against the defendant? Cer-
tainly plaintiff's title however defective it 
may be, is nevertheless amp~e 'to withstand 
the assaults of the defendant so long as the 
defendant has shown no right, title or inter-
est whatever in the property." 
This view has been re-iterated by the Court in 
the case of Pender vs. Bird, supra and in the case 
of Pleasant Grove City vs. Crease, et al. 1 Utah 2d 
352, 266 P2d 1019. 
POINT III 
ANY CLAIM OF APPELLANT IS BARRED BY 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Under the circumstances and the proof pre-
sented in this case it appears unnecessary to argue 
at length the position of the respondent with respect 
to the protection afforded his tax title by the Sta-
tute of Limitations, 78-12-5.1-.2-.3 and 78-12-7.1 
DCA 1953 as amended.l. By failing to prove his 
connection with the chain of fee or legal title to 
the property the appellant places himself in the 
1. See Appendix for text of sections referred to. 
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position of being unable to claim the benefit of any 
presumption of possession in favor of the legal own-
er granted by law. But, in this case, even assuming 
the presumption to be indulged, the affidavit of 
Leon Brown which, as previously argued is not con-
troverted, is sufficient to rebut any presumtion of 
possession in the appellant. Furthermore the res-
pondent is entitled to the benefit of the statute of 
limitations. The appellant seeks to avoid the sta'tute 
by claiming that the mere commencement of the 
action by appellant in 1'948, though the respondent 
was never joined as a party thereto tolled the Sta-
tute as to appellant. Such is not 'the law. In the 
case of Wood v. Dill, 3 Kan. App. 484, 43 P. 822, 
an action was commenced to foreclose a mortgage. 
There appeared as of record a mortgage to another 
party at the 'time that the action of foreclosure was 
commenced against the mortgagor and owner. The 
second mortgagee was not joined as a party to the 
action and the contention was made that despite the 
fact that the second mortgage was never joined as a 
party to the action, that the commencement of the 
action prevented 'the running of the Statute of Limi-
tations in his favor. The court said at page 823 of 
the opinion : 
"It is true that at said date (commence-
ment of the action) said mortgage had been 
assigned to Frank Wood, trustee, and the 
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sas had no interest therein. It is also true 
that the assignment to Frank Wood, trustee, 
was not recorded, but it plainly appeared of 
record that there was an incumbrance upon 
the premises ; and it cannot be doubted that 
if Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. had been a 
party to such action, and properly served, not 
only their rights could have been adjudicated 
bu't a judgment in such action wou!ld have been 
binding upon their assignee, whose assign-
ment was not of record. I't cannot be success-
fully contended that, by bringing the owner 
of the property affected into court, the sta-
tute of lilnitation would cease to run as 'to 
the mortgagee. Their interests were neither 
common nor identical. * * * As to each de-
fendant in an action, the action is commenced 
and is pending only from the time of service 
of the summons on hin1 or of his appearance 
without service; and where each m'ay object 
that the action was not commenced within the 
time limited by the statute, its commencement 
as to his objection is to be determined by the 
time of service on him, and not by the time 
of service on some other defendant. This is 
a rule applicable to every action, and applies 
as well to actions to enforce mechanics liens 
as to any others. * * *" 
Likewise in a Montana case, Marek v. Smith, 
314 P2d 864, it was held: 
"Where new parties are brought into a 
case, and it appears between commencement 
of the suit and time when they are brought in 
the period of limitations had expired, the new 
parties may plead the statute of limiations 
as far as they themselves are concerned but 
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the plea is not available to the original par-
ties." 
In a case under the Federal Rules decided in 
Pennsylvania, Carlisle v. Monongahela Railway Co., ~~~ 
16 F. R. D., 426 it was said, 
"Neither operation of federal civil pro-
cedure rule as to joinder of parties nor amend-
ment of complaint to assert direct cause of 
action against third party defendant brought 
in by original defendant instilled life into 
plaintiff's action against such third party 
defendant after expiration of limitation peri-
od, as such an amendment was in effect an 
original complaint, filed too [ate against third 
party defendant." 
It seems likewise to be recognized as a general 
rule that an intervention starts a new cause of ac-
tion and the limitations run anew as to the parties 
thus brought in and as between such parties and 
the parties already in the action. 
"However, it has been held that the sta-
tu'te of limitations ceases to run against the 
dlaim of an intervener only from the date of 
the intervention and not from the commence-
ment of the suit, where there is no community 
of interest and no privity of estate between 
the intervener and the other parties * * * 
Also, where a defendant makes no affirma-
'tive assertion of title to the property in the 
suit until he has himself made a party plain-
tiff, the statute of limitations continues to run 
against him until he is made plaintiff. * * *" 
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54 C. J. S. Lirnitation of Actions P. 311, Sec. 
276. 
Also in the case of Kam [{oon Wan v. E. E. 
Black, Ltd., decided in the district court of Hawaii, 
75 F. Supp. 553, it is said at page 564, 
"Under ordinary rules, since the filing 
of a petition to intervene marks the introduc-
tion of a new party and a new cause of ac-
tion, the situation is measured for the pur-
poses of the statute of limitations as of the 
date it was filed." 
Respondent claims therefor the proteetion of 
the Statutes of Limitation cited as against the claims 
of the appellant, and since appellant has failed 'to 
show himself either possessed of the property or 
to have paid taxes thereon within the period of the 
limitations provided by the sections cited, the bar 
of the statute provides further grounds, if needed, 
upon which to sustain the action of the lower court 
in quieting the title to the tract in question in lhe 
respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court below correctly decided the issues 
presented and granted the respondent the Summary 
Judgment quieting title in the respondent to the 
tract of land in question. The judgment of the lower 
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court should be affirmed and the respondent 
awarded his costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BOYDEN, TIBBALS, STATEN 
& CROFT 
By ALLEN H. TIBBALS 
Attorneys for Intervening 
Plaintiff and Respondent-
Leon Brown. 
351 So. State Street, Suite #2 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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APPENDIX 
78-12-5.1 UCA 1953 Seizure or possession within 
seven years - Proviso - Tax title - No action for 
the recovery of rea'l property or for the possession 
thereof shall be maintained, unless the plain tiff or 
his predecessor was seized or possessed of such pro-
perty within seven years from the commencement 
of such action; provided, however, that with respect 
to actions or defenses brought or interposed for 'the 
recovery or possession of or to quiet title or deter-
mine the ownership of real property against the 
holder of a tax title to such property, no such action 
or defense shall be commenced or interposed more 
than four years after the date of the tax deed, con-
veyance, or transfer creating such tax title unless 
the person commencing or interposing such action 
or defense or his predecessor has actually occupied 
or been in posession of such property within four 
years prior to the commencement or interposition of 
such action or defense or within one year from the 
effective date of this amendment. 
7'8-12-5.2 Holder of tax title - Limitations of ac-
tion or defense- Proviso- No action or defense 
for the recovery or possession of rea'l property or to 
quiet title or determine the ownership thereof shall 
be commenced or interposed against the ho'lder of a 
tax title after the expiration of four years from the 
date of the sale, conveyance or transfer of such tax 
title to any county, or directly to any other pur-
chase thereof at any public or private tax sale and 
after the expiration of one year from the date of 
this act. Provided, however, that this section shall 
not bar any action or defense by the owner of the 
legal title to such property where he or his prede-
cessor has actual1y occupied or been in actual pos-
session of such property within four years from 
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the commencement or interposition of such action 
or defense. And provided, further, that this section 
shall not bar any defense by a city or town, to an 
action by the holder of a tax title, to the effect that 
such city or town holds a lien against such property 
which is equal or superior to the claim of the holder 
of such tax title. 
78-12-5.3 Definition of "tax title" (and "action" 
- Separability) - The term "tax title" as used 
in section 78-12-5.2 and section 59-10-65, and the 
related amended sections 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-
12-12, means any title to rea!! property, whether 
valid or not, which has been derived through or is 
dependent upon any sale, conveyance or transfer 
of such property in the course of a statutory pro-
ceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied against 
such property whereby the property is relieved from 
a tax lien. 
Definition of "Action". 
The word "action" as used in these sections in-
cludes counterclaims and cross-complaints and all 
civil actions wherein. affirmative relief is sought. ' 
Invalidity in Part. 
If any section or part of section of this act 
shal!l be held invalid, it shall not invalidate the re-
maining portions of this act. 
78-12-7.1. Adverse possession - Presumption -
Proviso - Tax title - In every action for the re-
covery or possession of real property or to quiet 
title 'to or determine the owner thereof the person 
establishing a legal title to such property shall be 
presumed to have been possessed thereof within j 
the time required by law; and the occupation of 
such property by any other person shall be deemed I 
to have been under and in subordination to the legal 1 
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title, un'less it appears that such property has been 
held and possessed adversely to such legal title for 
seven years before the commencement of such action. 
Provided, however, that if in any action any party 
shall establish prima facie evidence that he is the 
owner of any real property under a tax title held 
by him and his predecessors for four years prior 
to the commencement of such action and one year 
after the effective date of this amendment he shall 
be presumed to be the o\vner of such property by 
adverse possession unless it appears that the owner 
of the lega:l ti tie or his predecessor has actually oc-
cupied or been in possession of such property under 
such title or that such tax title owner and his pre-
decessors have failed to pay all the taxes levied 
or assessed upon such property within such four 
year period. 
78-12-12.1. Possession and payment of taxes -
Proviso - tax title - In no case shall adverse pos-
session be established under the provisions of this 
Code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been 
occupied and clairned for the period of seven years 
continuously, and that the party, his predecessors 
and grantors have paid al1l the taxes which have 
been levied and assessed upon such land according 
to law. Provided, however, that payment by the 
holder of a tax title to real property or his pre-
decessors, of all the taxes levied and assessed upon 
such real property after the delinquent tax sale 
or transfer under which he claims for a period of 
not less than four years and for not less than one 
year after the effective date of this amendment, 
shall be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
this section in regard to the payment of taxes neces-
sary to estab'lish adverse possession. 
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